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The spring of 1933 ushered in a wave of labor unrest unparalleled in the history of 
California agriculture. Starting in April with the Santa Clara pea harvest, strikes erupted 
throughout the summer and fall as each crop ripened for harvest. The strike wave 
culminated with the San Joaquin Valley strike, the largest and most important strike in 
the history of American agriculture. 
All told, more than 47,500 farmworkers participated in the 1933 strikes. Twenty-
four of these strikes, involving approximately 37,500 workers, were under the leadership 
of the Communist-led Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU). In 
a dramatic reversal of its previous record of repeated debilitating losses, twenty of the 
CAWIU-led strikes resulted in partial wage increases while only four strikes ended in 
total defeat for the union. The remaining strikes, including three spontaneous walkouts, 
two American Federation of Labor (AFL) led strikes and two led by independent unions, 
resulted in partial gains in four out of the seven conflicts. 
Like their industrial counterparts, California farmworkers entered 1933 
embittered by three years of steadily declining wages and living conditions. Although 
these workers had endured intolerable conditions for decades, their burgeoning 
frustration and bitterness was for the first time being channeled into a combination of 
ethnic consciousness and labor militancy. Aroused by outbreaks of urban industrial action 
around the nation and inspired by the appearance, albeit illusory, of a sympathetic 
administration in Washington, farmworkers looked to the CAWIU for the leadership and 
guidance needed to transform this seemingly inchoate activism into an effective labor 
movement. 
Although the CAWIU had been involved in a series of major farmworker strikes 
since its inception in 1930, by 1933 it had little to show for its efforts. Despite a strong 
showing of workers' support at the onset of each conflict, in strike after strike workers 
had been forced by the brutal strike-busting tactics of the growers and local authorities to 
go back to work or flee the area without any of their demands being met. 
The union had learned important organizational lessons from each of these 
failures and began 1933 with a corps of well-trained and committed organizers who had 
earned recognition and respect from farmworkers across the state. By the time the first of 
the 1933 strikes broke out in April, detailed strike plans had been developed based on 
careful research of wages, working conditions, and harvest schedules for each crop. A 
standard list of demands had been developed that included substantial wage increases, 
union recognition, an eight-hour workday, time and a half for overtime, a closed shop 
with a union-controlled hiring hall, abolition of labor contracting, no union or ethnic 
discrimination, and free transportation of workers to and from the fields. A network of 
farm committees, representing the multi-ethnic character of the work force, had been 
elected by workers at mass meetings in each local growing area. And perhaps most 
important of all, CAW1U organizers had learned by experience to focus their organizing 
appeals on improving farmworker wages, working and living conditions, rather than on 
loftier aims couched in revolutionary rhetoric. 
Despite these preparations, the CAWIU's 1933 strike campaign got off to an 
inauspicious start on April 14, when a strike by 2,000 Mexican, Filipino, and white pea 
pickers collapsed in just two weeks in response to a familiar pattern of violence and 
intimidation by growers and local authorities. 
The next CAW1U venture, the El Monte berry pickers' strike, was to be an even 
more humiliating debacle. Under CAWIU leadership the strike was called by the 
approximately 600 Mexican berry pickers employed by Japanese growers in the San 
Gabriel Valley. Holding firm for their demand of sixty-five cents per crate, strike 
committee members not only rejected the growers offer of first forty cents and then forty-
five cents per crate but also openly challenged the CAWIU leadership of the strike. With 
the aid of the Mexican consul, the non-Communist leadership was able to undercut the 
CAWIU's influence through appeals to ethnic pride and by portraying the Communists as 
outside agitators. They were aided in this effort by local authorities who systematically 
jailed most of the CAWIU organizers in the area. Leadership of the strike then passed to 
the Confederacion de Uniones de Campesinos y Obreros Mexicanos (CUCOM), which 
settled with the growers in mid-July for increases of twenty-five cents for men and 
twenty cents for women. But because most of the crop had already been picked by scab 
labor, the majority of the workers were unable to benefit from the settlement. 
For the CAWIU, their humiliation at El Monte was tempered by their 
simultaneous strike victory among 1,000 cherry pickers on twenty of the largest ranches 
in Santa Clara County. Although the larger ranchers organized an all out assault against 
the union, this time the violence served to mobilize the strikers rather than to break the 
strike. Unable to break the strike, and faced with the loss of their crops', growers 
reluctantly agreed to bring the pickers' wages up to the thirty cents an hour demanded by 
the union. Although still unable to win recognition, the union ended the strike on June 14, 
overjoyed with its first solid wage victory in three years of organizing. 
Buoyed by their Santa Clara triumph, twenty-nine CAWIU delegates assembled 
at the union's first district convention on August 5 to engage in a serious round of self-
criticism and to plan for the critical late-summer fruit harvests. A detailed organizing 
strategy was developed including commitment to build a strong integrated union 
apparatus throughout the state's important agricultural centers; more aggressive 
organizing of women and children; "boring from within" established unions to form 
contacts with dissident elements and win the organizations over to the CAWIU; and 
building alliances with unemployed agricultural workers. 
CAWIU organizers left the convention to immediately embark upon a rapid 
succession of ambitious and mostly successful strikes. The late-summer harvest 
campaign began on August 7 and 8 with strikes involving 1,000 Mexican and Filipino 
sugar beet workers in Ventura County and 400 tomato pickers near San Diego. By 
August 14, pear pickers around San Jose and peach pickers near Tulare had joined the 
fray, with still other strikes soon spreading throughout the fruit growing districts of six 
San Joaquin Valley counties. With the exception of the Oxnard Sugar Beet Strike, almost 
all of these strikes resulted in significant wage victories for the union. Early in August the 
average farmworker wage in California had been approximately sixteen and a half cents 
an hour. By the end of the month the general agricultural wage was firmly established at 
twenty-five cents an hour. Supervised by CAWIU organizer Pat Chambers, the strikes 
were meticulously organized with leadership diffused throughout the work force so that it 
was more difficult for local authorities to break the strike by arresting the main leaders. 
The CAWIU also succeeded in conducting the strikes in the most law-abiding and 
nonviolent manner possible, making it more difficult for the authorities to justify using 
violence to break up the strikes. 
The only exception to this general lack of violence was the Oxnard Sugar Beet 
Strike, where the mayor of Oxnard, a sugar beet grower himself, used his authority to 
brutally break the strike. But with Oxnard the only loss, CAWIU leaders were 
increasingly confident of the inevitable triumph of militant unionism in California 
agriculture. This exuberance was quickly chastened when in early September they lost 
two major grape strikes in the San Joaquin Valley. 
First in Fresno and then in Lodi, growers and local authorities broke the strikes by 
wholesale arrests of strike leaders and by violent attacks on picket lines. Although in 
Fresno part of the loss could be blamed on the lack of CAWIU discipline, the 4,000 grape 
pickers in Lodi were a well-organized group. But still they were no match for the 
growers, who were willing to go to any length to keep the union out of their vineyards. 
Hundreds of well-armed deputized growers, businessmen, and legionnaires under the 
command of Colonel Walter E. Garrison, a grower and retired military officer, viciously 
assaulted 100 unarmed strikers while the police stood idly by. Any strikers who did 
attempt to defend themselves were arrested by the police for "rioting." The attack 
continued throughout the day, with strikers and their families being run out of their 
camps with fire hoses and tear gas. When union appeals to state authorities went 
unheeded, the strike quickly collapsed and Lodi growers succeeded in keeping their 
vineyards non-union. 
The CAWIU had little chance to mull over their losses in Fresno and Lodi for 
they had set their sights on the most important harvest of all—the October cotton harvest. 
More than 15,000 workers picked cotton in the San Joaquin Valley. Three-
quarters of this work force were Mexican, the remainder included southern blacks, 
Filipinos, and white migrants from the Southwest. Three years of depression had forced 
their wages down more than 75 percent. With the growers unwilling to pass on any of the 
150 percent increase in the price of cotton from the previous year, the pickers were ripe 
for organization. 
As tensions rose each side prepared for the ensuing conflict. Organizers spread 
through the valley building up locals and developing leadership. Alliances were made 
with liberal groups to help win public support for the struggle ahead. Demands were 
formulated including union recognition, a picking wage of $1.00 per hundred pounds, 
abolition of labor contracting, a union-controlled hiring hall, and no union discrimination. 
A general strike throughout the region was called for October 4. 
Growers held firm to their offer of a twenty-cent increase or sixty cents per 
hundred pounds and began to mobilize anti-union forces to break the strike. They 
organized themselves into agricultural protective associations with the somewhat 
ingenuous motto of "strikers work peacefully or leave the state of California." As soon as 
the strike began, the protective associations moved quickly to evict strikers from the 
camps. 
But breaking up the picket lines proved more difficult. With a strike area more 
than a hundred miles long and thirty to forty miles wide, the union sent out roving 
truckloads of pickets instructed to stop and picket only where they found workers in the 
held. The growers could then only break up picket lines when and where they found 
them. 
The first major altercation occurred in Woodvile, where, by violently attacking 
picketers, the growers served only to unite the heretofore ethnically divided work force 
under the leadership of rank-and-file leader "Big Bill" Hammett and his multi-racial 
general staff. 
By the second week of the strike, violence had greatly escalated as roving bands 
of armed growers moved through the region attacking all strikers who refused to return to 
work or leave the area. Law enforcement officials cooperated by arresting all those they 
thought to be strike leaders. Growers also applied pressure to local merchants, threatening 
to boycott all stores that did business with striking workers. State labor commissioner 
Frank C. McDonald joined in the public outcry, denouncing the boycott threat as a thinly 
disguised effort to "starve out" the strikers and appealing to both sides to allow state 
mediation of the conflict. Although the union quickly agreed to state intervention, the 
growers refused and the violence continued. 
Despite the growers' efforts, the strike grew to encompass 12,000 workers across 
Tulare, King, and Kem counties, with most of the cotton crop remaining unpicked in the 
fields. The violence reached its peak on October 10, when, in the small town of Pixley, a 
caravan of forty armed growers fired on a large group of unarmed strikers and their 
families who were gathered in the center of town to protest the arrests of strike leaders. 
The growers killed two and wounded at least eight more strikers while a group of 
highway patrolmen watched from a safe distance, refusing to intervene. 
Soon after the Pixley attack, growers in Kern County fired on a group of unarmed 
pickets killing one and wounding several more. After the shootings, the local authorities 
arrested some of the strikers for rioting and allegedly murdering one of their own people. 
Because of the public outcry after the shootings, Tulare County officials were 
pressured to arrest eight of the growers involved in the Pixley incident. But to placate 
local growers, they also arrested strike leader Pat Chambers on criminal syndicalism 
charges. 
In response to public pressure, the federal relief office directed the governor to 
distribute relief to all of the striking farmworkers marking it the first time in American 
labor history that the federal government offered relief to striking workers. 
Federal involvement did not stop there. New Deal administrator George Creel 
intervened in the conflict, arguing that although agricultural workers were excluded from 
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), industrial disputes in 
agriculture were under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Board, which he 
represented. 
Creel came prepared to impose a "fair settlement" on both parties by threatening 
revocation of federal relief if the union did not agree to fact finding and by assuring 
growers that without relief strikers would immediately return to work at sixty cents per 
hundred pounds pending the outcome of the fact finding. 
Seriously disturbed by the specter of militant communist unionism which he 
found antithetical to the New Deal's paternalistic labor relations ideology, Creel's intent 
was to eliminate the CAWIU's influence in agriculture by undermining its hold over the 
strikers. But in doing so he seriously underestimated the commitment of the cotton 
pickers to their strike and to their union. Government threats to condition relief on a 
return to work failed to sway the majority of the strikers, and the fact finding hearings 
began on October 19 with the cotton strike still in full swing. After two days of testimony 
from growers and a succession of workers, the federal fact finders proposed a seventy-
five-cent increase to settle the strike. To induce the growers' cooperation Creel promised 
that if they granted the seventy-five-cent increase, all federal relief would be immediately 
cut off and workers returning to the fields would be given full protection from the 
strikers. 
The strikers remained adamant, holding out for eighty cents and union 
recognition. But on October 27, the CAWIU Central Strike Committee, arguing that the 
strike had already dragged on long enough, convinced the strikers to go back to work at 
the seventy-five cents per hundred pounds, without union recognition. 
The most dramatic and significant strike in the history of American agriculture 
ended with no clear victor but with all sides—the growers, the union, and the federal 
government—claiming victory. Twelve thousand farmworkers under the leadership of 
some of the CAWlU's most dedicated and experienced organizers had brought the most 
powerful and determined growers in California to a standstill. What the strike had 
ultimately made clear, in the words of labor historian Cletus Daniel, was "the 
irreconcilable conflict between the CAWIU's militant unionism and the federal 
government's new rational and paternalistic labor policies. . . . " 
 The union had proven itself in the 1933 strikes, but it had never won recognition. 
And when the dust settled, little of the pre-strike union organization remained intact. The 
CAWIU would continue to organize, but it would be unable to overcome the combined 
forces of the Roosevelt administration and intense grower opposition. 
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